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The economic history of Central Europe is a challenging field, mainly because its 
unifying theme seems to be the patchwork-character of the region. The (dis-) integration of 
Germany, of the Habsburg-Monarchy, of Czechoslovakia, and not a least of Poland at various 
points in time has been the subject of various case studies. However, what we still miss is a 
coherent treatment of the economic development of Central Europe since the beginnings of 
industrialization. A key problem comes from the fact that traditional economic theories of 
trade and structural change ignore the effects of changing borders - or generally access to 
markets. This paper surveys the development of agriculture as a part of overall economic 
development in the major regions of Poland over the period of 1870 through 1973. It argues 
that accounting for the dramatic changes in  market access of  the  various parts of Poland 
provides a key for understanding the modern economic development of the country. It is 
mainly due to differences in market access that we observe a structural divergence between 
the main regions of Poland up to the World War I, followed by significant but incomplete 
convergence during the interwar years. Not only did the sectoral composition of the regional 
economies diverge and later converge, but also did levels of factor productivity and factor 
prices. After World War II a very uneven implementation of economic policies preserved old 
structural differences between the regions of Poland and created new ones. The rest of this 
chapter has the following structure: I start in section II with a very short outline of the 
theoretical  background. Based on this, section III sketches the main changes in regional 
market access 1870 – 1973 at a regional level, while section IV describes in some detail the 
development of agriculture and economic development in the regions and for Poland as a 
whole. Section V concludes.  
   3 
II. Theoretical background  
 
How do agricultural and overall economic developments interact? In this section I will 
very briefly introduce some theoretical guidelines for an analysis of the Polish – and more 
generally the Central European - experience. First, traditional approaches stressed the role of 
productivity in agriculture for economic development, providing labor and food as necessary 
preconditions for the growth of industries and services (Nurkse 1953, Rostow 1960, Todaro 
1989). Instead, economic historians have identified important cases of high productivity in 
agriculture associated with increasing backwardness relative to economic neighbors  with 
similar or even lower agricultural productivity  (Mokyr 1976, also Field 1978). Recent 
advances in economic theory suggest that accounting for differences in market access might 
help to resolve the issue. In a nutshell, the assertion  that high agricultural productivity will 
unambiguously tend to foster overall economic development holds only in the special case of 
a closed economy. In this case, demand from agriculture can foster industrialization and 
overall economic development, but still limited by the size of the market and subject to 
industrial organization (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943). However, the typical  European experience 
around 1870 is rather that of small open economies, where high productivity in agriculture or 
differences in endowments can create incentives to specialize in this sector along the lines of 
comparative advantage,  and  thereby  slow down sectoral change.  In the presence of 
differences in productivity growth between sectors - or alternatively positive spill-over effects 
from industry to agriculture - an initially high productivity in agriculture can then imply major 
losses in terms of long-run growth (Matsuyama 1992, Duranton 1998).  
Second, trade costs  are relevant  for the pattern of comparative advantage itself. 
Especially with respect to smaller countries or regions within countries it is important to note 
that the incentive to specialize and even the direction of specialization will largely depend on 
trade costs: what matters is not general comparative advantage based on relative endowments 
or factor productivities relative to all potential trading partners, but rather “local comparative 
advantage” of a region relative to her accessible neighbors (Deardorff 2004). That is to say, a 
comparative advantage of one European region relative  another  will not be sufficient to 
induce specialization as long as trade costs between the two are not low enough. A change in 
political borders as often observed in European history can change  local comparative 
advantages and  hence  bring about industrialization or de-industrialization, lowering trade 
costs with some neighbors but increasing the costs to trade with others.    4 
Finally third, differences in relative factor prices can induce biased technical change 
and thereby deepen the pattern of comparative advantage as noted by Hicks (1932) and shown 
in Hayami and Rutton (1970). “A change in the relative prices of the factors of production is 
itself a spur to invention and to inventions of a particular kind – directed at economizing the 
use of a factor which has become relatively expensive” (Hicks, 1932, pp. 124-25). As we will 
see in the following, the cost of using labor in some parts of Poland prior to the First World 
War had a distinctively nationalist dimension. 
 
III. Changes in regional market access 1850 – 1970 
   
To start with, it is a non-trivial task to define “Poland” over the hundred years under 
consideration. Between 1772 and 1795, the noblemen’s republic of Poland (Rzeczpospolita 
Polska) was divided into three parts between the empires of tsarist Russia, the Habsburg 
monarchy and the emergent Prussia. As a consequence of the partitions - “the first very great 
breach in the modern political system of Europe” (Edmund Burke) - Poland disappeared from 
the European map. The three partitions developed into appendices of the partitioning empires. 
Within the Russian partition, the Kingdom of Poland or Congress Poland, in personal union 
with Russia enjoyed certain autonomy within the empire up to the failed January uprising in 
1863/64.  The Prussian partition  area consisted of  parts of Pomerania and Great Poland 
(Wielkopolska) with Poznan as her centre. Instead, Upper Silesia is often also treated as Polish 
part of Prussia due to her large share of Polish speaking population, but did not belong to the 
Rzeczpospolita at the end of the 18
th century. And from the Congress of Vienna onwards the 
Habsburg partition consisted of Galicia. At the end of the First World War all three partition 
powers were severely weakened through war and revolution,  which  opened the way  for 
Poland’s restoration. As a rough approximation the territory of this new Polish state had four 
distinct parts: the three parts of the former  Rzeczpospolita, which Russia, Prussia and the 
Habsburg monarchy by 1795 had divided between themselves, and some territories in the east 
that were claimed by several Polish political groups. Official statistics use to organize the 
state (from 1921 onwards) in 17 administrative units (vojvodships) that followed the former 
partition borders and hence allow comparisons with the situation before 1919. These units are 
often found to be aggregated into the mentioned four parts of the new state: the western, 
southern and central vojvodships, covering approximately the former partition areas, and the   5 
eastern vojvodships, covering the n ewly attained areas in the east.
1 After the Second World 
War, Poland again experienced a massive border change. It lost her eastern territories, namely 
the eastern vojvodships of the Second Republic,  the  eastern  half of  Galicia,  and the 
vojvodship of Wilno, while it gained Gdansk, large parts of the formerly Prussian province of 
East Prussia, the Prussian provinces Lower Silesia, Upper Silesia, West Prussia, most of the 
Prussian province Pomerania and a quarter of Brandenburg. The Map in the appendix shows 
the development of  Poland’s borders 1870  – 1970 with several simplifications. In the 
following we will focus on the changes in market access induced by these border changes.  
 
[Map about here] 
 
From the second half of the 19
th century onwards, the partition areas developed tight 
trade linkages with the respective partition powers. The following graph shows the evolution 
of standardized wheat price spreads between Cracow and Lwow and Vienna on the one hand 
and Berlin and Poznan on the other hand. The spreads are defined as price differences 
standardized by the average price between the two cities and by their distance, to make them 
comparable over time and space.
2 
 
[Graph 1 about here] 
 
We see that integration between Vienna and the Polish  centers Cracow and Lwow 
improved a lot between the 1860s and the turn of the century as did integration between 
Berlin and Poznan. In the latter case, however, while integration into Germany stays high, 
domestic trade flow data indicate a certain reversal of the integration process during the last 
years before the First World War while integration of Great Poland and Pomerania with the 
Kingdom of Poland deepened (see Wolf 2006a). We lack comparable price data on Russia but 
know that the trade links between the Kingdom of Russia and the rest of the Russian empire 
grew closer after the removal of the internal tariff barrier in 1851 and the introduction of a 
common external tariff.
3 In addition, the tariff conflicts between Germany and Russia since 
1877, and especially after 1879 deepened the integration of the Polish regions with their 
                                                 
1 Western vojvodships comprised: Poznan, Pomerania, Silesia; central: city of Warsaw, Warsaw, Lódz, Kielce, 
Lublin, Bialystok; southern: Kraków, Lwów, Stanislawów, Tarnopol; eastern: Wilno, Nowogrod, Polesia, 
Wolhynia; see Maly Rocznik Statystyczny, Warsaw (1939). 
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3 See Rosa Luxemburg, „Die Industrielle Entwicklung Polens“, Leipzig 1898, p. 9f.    6 
partition powers as they tended to divert trade into the domestic markets. The European 
imports into Russia decreased from 326 million  Gold Rubles (1876-1881) over 304 million 
(1881-1886) to 224 (1886-1891),
4 while trade between the Kingdom of Poland and other parts 
of the Russian Empire increased. Most notably, since 1895 we find net-imports of agricultural 
products into the Kingdom of Poland.
5  Table 1 shows the trade balance for the three partition 
areas, estimated for about 1914. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Hence, local comparative advantage was very different in the three partitions when the 
First World War started. While the Kingdom was a net-importer of agricultural products and 
raw-materials, the Prussian partition exported raw materials (mainly coal from Upper Silesia 
to other parts of Germany) and agricultural products (mainly from Great Poland and 
Pomerania to other parts of Germany, after 1892 also to the Kingdom of Poland), both 
running bold surpluses. Galicia in turn had no clear comparative advantage in any products, 
running a trade deficit. “Therefore it is not astonishing that [the Polish part of the Habsburg 
Monarchy], poor and debt-encumbered, can only balance her accounts by the exportation on a 
large scale of her own labour” (Polish Encyclopedia, 1922, cited in Morawska (1989), p. 246). 
The per capita values of this balances stress the low level of economic development of Galicia 
in the backwater of the Habsburg monarchy. As we will explore below, Galician agriculture 
could not compete in export markets with Hungarian producers while Galician industry was 
hampered by competition from Bohemia, Silesian, and Lower Austrian industries as well as 
by inappropriate institutions. The First World War changed all that. The former partition areas 
disintegrated with their former occupiers, while not in a uniform manner, see table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The previously large trade with Russia had declined close to zero, trade integration 
with Germany decreased a lot from a high level, and trade with the successor states of the 
Habsburg monarchy  was relatively stable over time (see De Ménil and Maurel 1994 on 
Habsburg, Wolf 2006a on Germany). On the flipside of this, integration between the various 
parts of the Second Polish Republic defined in her borders of 1921 increased quickly as can 
be seen in price (Trenkler and Wolf 2005) and domestic trade flow data. This integration into 
                                                 
4 Op. Cit., p. 13.  
5 See Landau and Tomaszewski (1986), p. 80.    7 
the new domestic market was better for textiles and agricultural products than for raw 
materials, iron and steel and machinery (Wolf 2005), indicating that domestic markets indeed 
partly substituted the lost access to the partition empires. Consequently, foreign trade of the 
new Polish state was  characterized by exports of raw materials (1938: 57%), agricultural 
products and foodstuffs (1938: 36%),  and imports of raw materials (1938: 64%)  and 
manufactures (1938: 21%), both mainly with Germany and the UK. 
After the Second World War, Poland experienced again a major border change and 
suffered from disintegration  from her western neighbours. While immediately after the war, 
imports from the US and the UK dominated the picture, this changed with the formation of 
the Comecon in 1949, the introduction of the soviet model of foreign trade and western 
embargo policies against countries under socialist rule. Through the 1970s both imports and 
exports with the USSR accounted for 25 - 35%, followed by trade with Czechoslovakia and 
the GDR, overall with a negative balance of trade (see MRS 2005, p. 362). The fact that 
Poland also lost access to western capital markets, which played a major role before the war, 
probably constrained her economic development. However, the structure of this trade clearly 
indicates that local comparative advantage had changed once again: while in 1950 Poland 
exported mainly raw materials and agricultural products (80% of total exports), in 1960 
manufactures (especially machinery) accounted for nearly 40%, and in 1970 for 50% of all 
exports (see Jezierski and Leszczynska 2003, pp. 535 ff.).  The following chapter examines 
how these largely exogenous changes affected Poland’s agriculture and economic 
development.   
 
IV. Divergence and Convergence:  agriculture and industrialization in Polish 
regions 1850-1970 
IV.1 The period up to 1914 
 
Around 1850, the various parts of Poland were all predominantly agricultural, with 
very limited islands of early industrialization, such as some textile industry in Great Poland 
already in decline (see Luczak 2001, p. 71), the beginning rise of textile industries in Lodz 
and Silesia, and some mining and metal industries in Upper Silesia. Agriculture was similarly 
extensive and backward in the Kingdom of Poland as in Galicia and the Prussian partition. 
Table 3  shows the different sizes of these regions, and estimates of population and 
urbanization. Around 1850 all  regions were roughly similar, with Upper Silesia showing an   8 
early lead in population density and Pomerania with a somewhat higher share of urban 
population due to several trading cities in a sparsely settled region.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
An important common feature w as significant population growth within these 
agricultural economies, probably under way everywhere since the end of the Napoleonic 
wars.
6 Over the second half of the 19
th century, the Kingdom of Poland showed the highest 
average growth rate, followed by Upper Silesia, Galicia, and the rest of the Prussian Partition. 
Three factors help to explain the population growth rates as well as their differences. First, a 
decrease in mortality due to slow but steady improvements in agricultural productivity and 
advances in hygienic standards was visible immediately after 1815 in all parts of Poland, kept 
in check by the occurrence of epidemics (Cholera 1831) and bad harvests (1847), which were 
worst in Galicia (see  Jezierski and  Leszczynska 2003, p. 142). Second, the  abolition of 
serfdom (1807 in Prussia, 1848 in Austria and 1864 in the Kingdom of Poland) contributed to 
a significant increase in birth rates, while third, an extension of transport facilities (streets 
during the first and railways during the second half of the 19
th century) helped the integration 
of markets, smoothing the local effects of bad harvests and giving access to urban demand 
and supply. Especially the abolition of serfdom had long-lasting effects on economic structure 
by diversifying the peasantry into a class of peasants owning small to medium-sized holdings 
and leaving a large fraction of the village population as landless as before. Here, the situation 
in Galicia differed from that in other regions, because it proved especially difficult to absorb 
the growing landless proletariat, in striking difference to the experience of Upper Silesia, the 
Kingdom of Poland, and also Pomerania and Great Poland. Table 4 shows estimates of the 
occupational structure of these regions around 1900. While Upper Silesia industrialized, and 
the Kingdom of Poland was on the way to industrialization, in Great Poland and Pomerania 
people found increasingly employment in processing-industries related to agriculture (Eddie 
2005), in crafts, a growing administration, and the close industrial centers of Germany. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
                                                 
6 Population statistics for Galicia start in 1829, but the first census is hold only in 1857, while compulsory 
registration of births, deaths and marriage in Prussia from 1815 onwards resulted in detailed statistical 
information already before the first census was carried out in 1861. For the Kingdom of Poland, a Statistical 
Committee collected data for the period 1874-1913, while earlier figures refer to private collections, see 
Zubrzycki (1953), p. 249f.    9 
As peasants divided their land among their progeny, population growth contributed to 
an ever declining average size of landholdings and an increase of fragmentation. Zubrzycki 
(1953) mentions a study on the evolution of average farm sizes in 20 Galician villages over 
150 years. While average holdings during the partitions (1787) had 7.24 ha, the number was 
down to 5.58 ha in 1850 and 3.17 ha in 1930. Moreover, Bujak (1908) reports that in 1902 a 
peasant holding in Galicia consisted on average of no less than 20 scattered strips. Table 5 
shows some data on the development in size distributions in Polish regions since 1902.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
At the turn of the century, 81% of all landholdings in Galicia were very small (5 ha or 
less), covering 49% of all agricultural land, while the corresponding figures for the Kingdom 
of Poland were 65% and 31% and for Great Poland 78% and 13%. On the other end, large 
farms with more than 20 ha covered just 11% of all farmland in Galicia, but 34% in Russian 
Poland and 40% in Great Poland. In Pomerania,  6% of all farms had more than 20 ha, 
covering 52% of all land (see Jezierski and Leszczynska 2003, p. 168).  
The small and fragmented Galician farms mostly served to feed their owners but 
produced little tradable surplus.  Moreover, small size and fragmentation limited access to 
capital and technological improvements. This subsistence character of Galician farming is 
visible in the composition of crops and will be a feature of southern Polish farming through 
1973. Table 6 shows that before the First World War there is little specialization in Galician 
farming, all kind of grain as well as potatoes are cultivated, and the cultivation of sugar beet 
as an “industrial crop” is very limited.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
A similar picture emerges from the holdings of animal husbandry in 1870 and 1900. 
Around 1870 Galician peasants held sheep, horses, pigs in similar numbers but many more 
cattle, reflecting the typical behavior of subsistence farming keeping the one cow to cover the 
own need of milk and butter. Compared to this, agriculture in the Kingdom of Poland appears 
to be better developed. The much higher share of rye production in total agricultural land use 
reflects a higher market orientation. Until the 1890s, the Kingdom of Poland was a net-
exporter of grain, exporting  in 1874 some 20 million Rubles to western markets, often via 
Baltic routes. Imports of cheap grain after the 1870s into Europe from overseas markets but   10 
also from other parts of Russia caused a general crisis in European agriculture (see O’Rourke 
1997), and directly affected the Kingdom of Poland. However, it would be exaggerated to 
speak of stagnation in the case of the Kingdom of Poland as agricultural output continued to 
increase a lot. What we observe are structural changes after 1880, especially a significant 
increase in industrial employment, mainly in textile industries, rapid growth of some cities 
like Lodz and Warsaw and hence increasing demand for agricultural surplus. As mentioned 
earlier, from the mid of the 1890s onwards this domestic demand turned the Kingdom of 
Poland into a net-importer of grains. The “first globalization” is also reflected in the decline 
of sheep husbandry between 1870 and 1900, where cheap imports from Australia decreased 
profitability. The Prussian partition clearly shows the most advanced agriculture of all Polish 
regions. The  structure of landholding  was characterized by many farms large enough to 
introduce intensive production methods. The composition of crops at the turn of the century is 
much more specialized, especially on rye and crops suited for further industrial processing, 
such as potatoes and sugar beet. Similarly, the high share of sheep in total animal husbandry 
around 1870 reflected an orientation towards the demand from textile industries. When 
overseas imports of sheep increased in the 1870s and European textiles turned to cotton rather 
than wool, agriculture in the Prussian partition was very quick to respond. We see a large shift 
towards the production of pigs for an increasing demand for meat due to higher wages in both, 
the Prussian partition and her German markets in Brandenburg/ Berlin and elsewhere.  
Table 7 shows the evolution of land productivity in the different partitions. Consider 
the change in grain output per ha after 1880. While the Prussian partition is already slightly 
ahead of  the other Polish regions in 1880, a real leap occurs after the turn of the century. 
Productivity  figures  in all grains nearly double, while they increase close to threefold for 
potatoes. Also, the productivity of animal husbandry is much higher: for example, while a 
Galician cow will give on average some 600 liter per year, the figure is about 3000 liter per 
year for Great Poland (see Jezierski and Leszczynska 2003, p. 173).  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
There is an interesting pattern in the productivity figures for the three partitions 
compared to the ones of their partitioners. In 1900 the Kingdom of Poland is slightly ahead of 
other parts of European Russia, but both, Galicia and the Prussian partition lag behind the 
Habsburg or respectively the German average. By about 1910 this has changed insofar as the 
Kingdom of Poland apparently has a marked absolute productivity advantage over the rest of   11 
European Russia, Galicia is as backward as before, while the Prussian partition now has an 
absolute advantage relative to the German average, which is among the highest in Europe at 
the time. This change in productivity is obviously related to an intensification of agricultural 
production by use of chemical fertilizers and mechanization in the Prussian partition. Around 
1906 in Great Poland there was one combine per 350 ha, while in the Kingdom of Poland 
there was one per 660 ha and in Galicia one per 3450 ha. Similarly, one thresher in Great 
Poland was found per 39 ha, one per 120 ha in the Kingdom and one per 450 ha in Galicia 
(see Jezierski and Leszczynska 2003, p. 170). The cause of this dramatic intensification can 
be seen in two interrelated factors: economic nationalism and improving integration with the 
growing industrial regions of Germany.  
To face competition of cheap grain  imports due to declining transport costs Prussian 
agriculture tried both to shift production away from grain towards potatoes and sugar beet and 
successfully lobbied for an increase in grain tariffs, introduced in 1879 and increased in 1885, 
1887, 1902 (see Brentano 1925, p. 100). But Germany continued to net-import grain as 
transport costs declined further and several exporters counteracted the tariff increase with 
export promoting railway tariffs and subsidies (see O’Rourke and Williamson 1999, p. 95ff.). 
This competition helped to foster intensification of German agriculture, as even increasing 
tariffs proved insufficient for protection. Moreover, in the Prussian east, labor cost was rising 
for a different set of reasons. The industrialization in Saxony, Berlin and in the Ruhr together 
with opportunities for overseas migration attracted labor from the east. In consequence we 
observe an outflow of people from east German agriculture into central and west German 
industries (“Ostflucht”,  see Grant 2005 for a s urvey), and  correspondingly  a  shortage of 
agricultural labor in the east (“Leutenot”). In principle, this outflow of labor to the west could 
have easily been compensated by a seemingly unlimited supply of cheap labor from the east, 
mainly the Kingdom of Poland and Galicia. But the German population, actually in minority 
in Great Poland and other parts of the Prussian  partition feared a “Polonization”. From a 
Polish perspective, rather a massive “Germanization” was under way in the Prussian east, 
escalating in the 1870s with the “Kulturkampf” between the Catholic Church and the Polish 
population on one side and  the government and the (predominantly protestant) German 
population on the other.  Among the many facets of this ethnic conflict  was a German 
immigration policy, trying to balance the demand for cheap labor from Prussian landholders 
against the fear of “Polonization” (see Olson 1996). Seasonal migration from the Kingdom of 
Poland to various parts of Germany increased after 1890 from about 30,000 per annum to 
over 100,000 around 1905 and over 300,000 in 1913. Similar inflows of seasonal labor were   12 
coming from Galicia, with about 240,000 per annum in 1910 (see Zubrzycki 1953, p. 258f.). 
The conflict can be seen by disputes between agrarian lobby groups such as the “Bund der 
Landwirte” or the “Zentralverein Westpreussischer Landwirte” arguing for cheap labor with 
groups lobbying for “Germanization” policies such as the “Deutscher Ostmarkenverein”. That 
cheap Polish migrants did indeed not completely substitute the outflow from the Prussian east 
to industrial centers is stressed by the fact that even for the most unskilled workers there is a 
significant increase in wages 1884 – 1914 both in absolute terms and relative to wages in the 
Ruhr.
7 Hence, ethnic struggles provided an additional incentive to substitute labor by capital 
and thereby added a strong factor towards biased technological change. Accordingly, major 
efforts were made to provide capital to agriculture in the Prussian partition. This involved 
again aspects of economic nationalism, and the German government was eager to channel 
capital to German landholders, however with very limited success. Linking up with earlier 
ideas to educate and develop the Polish nation as a preparation for a future struggle for 
independence (“praca organiczna”, see Kieniewicz 1964),  agrarian credit cooperatives 
developed as a  powerful instrument in this ethnic conflict. In consequence, in 1895 the 
number of agrarian credit cooperatives per ha was significantly above the average of the 
Prussian provinces (see Müller and Lorenz 2006, p. 193).  
Capital helped the intensification of agriculture and both land and labor productivity 
increased. Kostrowicka (1972) provided estimates of labor productivity in 1911-13 showing 
that total produced agricultural output (converted in grain units) per people living from 
agriculture in Galicia was about 11.4, in the Kingdom of Poland about 13.6 and in the 
Prussian Partition about 33.2.  Given this very positive development in agriculture in the 
Prussian partition relative to the rest of Poland, one might expect following development 
economists (Nurkse 1953, Rostow 1960, Todaro 1989) that industrial progress would have 
been faster in this part of Poland as well. In fact, the region experienced industrialization, but 
a fairly limited one. Especially beet sugar processing, distilleries and breweries grew in terms 
of number, output and employment and were typically much larger than the similar factories 
in other parts of Poland. In 1902, there were 39 sugar factories where each produced an 
average 7,300 tons per year compared to 49 in the Kingdom producing just 3,300 tons on 
average (see Zientara 1973, p 466f.). Also notable is the development of factories producing 
agricultural machines (Poznan, Torun, Bydgoszcz) and machine industries related to, often 
                                                 
7 Between 1884 and 1914 the common wage rate per day for a unskilled workers in the east increased both 
absolute and relative to the Ruhr: for Poznan the figures are 1.60 Mark (1884) and 3.10 Mark (1914), relative to 
Düsseldorf they are 0.67 (1884) and 0.76 (1914). Similar developments took place in all east Prussian cities. 
Data from Schmitz (1888), and Centralblatt für das Deutsche Reich (1914).     13 
subsidized,  armament  industries  and shipbuilding (Gdansk, Elblag). The total number of 
industrial workers in the Prussian partition (without Upper Silesia) is estimated at 83,000 
(1897), growing to some 122,000 (1907). 
Compared to this, Upper Silesia and the Kingdom of Poland experienced a much faster 
industrialization prior to the First World War. Table 8 shows the number of industrial workers 
in the various parts of Poland from the turn of the century onwards.    
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
  Already around 1800 new techniques imported from Britain were used to explore and 
process the rich endowments of Upper Silesia in coal and iron ores. In 1820 John Baildon 
built in Katowice the first reverberatory furnace using Cort’s puddling techniques to produce 
wrought iron. The first Bessemer converter was introduced in Upper Silesia in 1863, in the 
Kingdom of Poland in 1878. In the case of Upper Silesia most of this industrial production 
met the growing demand from Brandenburg/ Berlin and Lower Silesia, accounting in 1885 for 
43% of total exports in hard coal on railways. About 25% were shipped to the Habsburg 
monarchy, 17% to Great Poland and Pomerania, but just 4% to the Kingdom of Poland. The 
respective figures for iron and processed metal differ insofar as demand from the Kingdom of 
Poland accounts for a larger share (11%), and that of Habsburg for a much smaller (5%).
8 Up 
to 1913 integration between Upper Silesia and Brandenburg/ Berlin and Lower Silesia will 
increase, that with Great Poland and Pomerania stagnate, while there is disintegration with 
both the Kingdom of Poland and various parts of the Habsburg monarchy due to a growing 
heavy industry around Czestochowa and increasing competition from the Bohemian industry.   
  The development in the Kingdom of Poland was dominated by cotton textile industries 
around Lodz, where the Polish government used its autonomy to foster industrial development 
by attracting textile entrepreneurs from the west with cheap land, subsidies, reduced import 
tariffs and the perspective of a large protected Russian market. In 1828, Ludwig Geyer arrived 
from Berlin, whose “white factory” opened in 1839 using the first power looms on Polish 
territory. Many others followed, as did Karl Scheibler (arrived 1854 from Monschau, then 
Belgium), whose factory worked in 1879 with no less than 3500 power looms and was one of 
the largest in Europe at the turn of the century. Besides the cotton industry, there was a 
                                                 
8  All data comes from Königlich-Preußisches Ministerium der Öffentlichen Arbeiten (1886),  „Statistik der 
Güterbewegung auf Deutschen Eisenbahnen im Jahre 1885“, Berlin and Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1914), 
„Statistik der Güterbewegung auf Deutschen Eisenbahnen im Jahre 1913“, Berlin.  
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growing wool industry (Kalisz, Warsaw, also Bielsko in Upper Silesia), and linen (Zyrardow, 
close to Warsaw).  According to Jezierski (1967, p. 145f.), initially it was the abolition of 
serfdom and the growing domestic market of the Kingdom of Poland which led to the growth 
of textile industries. However, after an internal tariff barrier between the Kingdom of Poland 
and the rest of the Russian Empire was removed in 1851, and especially after the railway 
connected the factories to Warsaw, European Russia and Asia from the 1870s onwards, the 
textile industry boomed.  The value of industrial production leaped from 11 million rubles 
(1850) over 123 (1870), 216 (1890) to 600 (1900), and the share of exports to Russia in total 
production increased from 27% (1880) to  incredible 66% (1900). While the total share of 
industry remained limited in terms of employment (the number of industrial workers rose 
from about 180,000 in 1894 to 335,000 in 1904 out of a population of 10,000,000), growth 
rates were remarkable  (twice the rates in the Prussian partition  1895-1905)  and the 
development was strong enough to turn the region into a net-importer of food-stuffs. Even 
more notable is the fact that this Polish industrialization differed very much from the state-led 
growth in other parts of Russia (see Gerschenkron 1962, p. 119ff.). When Russian subsidies 
declined after the failed uprising in 1863/64, they were replaced by private capital investment, 
often involving foreign capital from Germany, Austria and France.
9  
  In contrast, industrialization was much more limited in Galicia. Of the roughly 90,000 
industrial workers in Galicia in 1902, 19% worked in food and mineral industries, 17% in 
mining, 11% in metallurgical industries, 12% in wood processing. The most promising among 
them was the Galician oil industry. Exploitation started in the 1860s, foreign investors were 
quick to provide the necessary capital, and around 1910 Galician oil accounted for some 5% 
of the world production. However, there is a striking lack of positive spillovers into other 
parts of the economy. Most of the oil was processed elsewhere, and foreign capital did not 
only dominate the industry (the only three Polish companies accounted for just 0.5% of the 
industries’ capital stock), but did little to invest in the region (see Diamand 1915, pp. 58-61). 
As recently argued by Frank (2005) it was the absence of institutions to coordinate vertical 
integration and price policies that kept the third largest oil producer of the world in desperate 
backwardness.  Other industries suffered from competition  from Bohemian and Austrian 
imports,  also from the Kingdom of Poland,  especially after the opening of railway 
connections (see Jezerski and Leszczynska, 2003, p. 190). The domestic market for industrial 
products was extremely limited due to the inefficiency of Galician agriculture, characterized 
mainly by subsistence farming. In difference to the Prussian partition, there was neither a 
                                                 
9 According to a rough estimate, foreign capital dominated 25% of all factories in the Kingdom of Poland, 
employing 69% of all workers and producing 60% of industrial output, see Jezierski (1987), p. 65.   15 
demand for Galician agriculture due to the strong dominance of Hungarian farming within the 
Habsburg  Empire, nor any shortage of labor to induce intensification. Average daily wages 
for unskilled farm labor were very low and remained so, estimated for 1900 at 66% of the 
Prussian Partition and 78% of the Kingdom of Poland (see Morawska 1989, p. 258). Hence, 
Galicia stayed in the backwater of Central Europe, unable to develop economically, but 
exporting a growing number of people to other parts of Europe and overseas: an annual 
average of 35,000 in the 1890s grew to over 50,000 p.a. in the decade before 1914. The 
Polish-born  development  economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan  argued in his seminal paper 
“Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and Southern-Eastern Europe” (Economic Journal, 
53, pp. 202-211) that the only way out of this development trap would be a state-coordinated 
industrialization, creating complementarities and spill-over effects for self-sustained growth. 
More recently, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) have shown that this is indeed possible 
under reasonable microeconomic assumptions. An attempt to realize this idea was actually 
made in Poland in the 1930s.  
 
IV.2 The Interwar Period 
 
  Few European regions had been so severely affected by the First World War as was 
Poland, with an estimated 40% of all buildings in smaller towns and villages destroyed, 
massive industrial sabotage by foreign (especially German) troops during the last weeks of the 
war, a loss of 1,817 thousand piece of cattle, 987 thousand horses, and some 4,5 million ha of 
previously  cultivated land  lying idle after intensive fighting.
10 When Pilsudski returned to 
Poland in November 1918, he managed to balance the interests between various local 
governments that had filled the power vacuum left after Habsburg’s and Germany’s defeat. A 
central government was installed in Warsaw, which saw the organisation of a general census 
among its first tasks. 
  The census was conducted in 1921 and showed that due to the devastations of the war 
and previous emigration Poland’s population had stagnated between 1910 and 1921, in spite 
of massive natural increases (see table 3). The new Polish state was a predominantly agrarian 
economy, with 64% of the working population in agriculture (table 4), among them about 10 
million agricultural workers owning only extremely small pieces of land or no at all. Also, the 
census proved the pattern  of  striking economic  differences between the various parts of 
Poland prior to the First World War. Urbanization rates were still significantly higher in the 
                                                 
10 See Landau and Tomaszewski (1999), p. 16.    16 
western and the central vojvodships (about 30%), while Galicia lagged behind (21%) in spite 
of a high population density, and the newly attained eastern vojvodships showed both low 
urbanization (13%) and low density of population,  
Owing to the long period of partition, the various parts of the country were not only 
hugely different in terms  of economic development, but also  separated by different 
legislations about virtually all aspects of social, political and economic life. Internal tariffs, 
regulations, and a lack of transport and communication facilities prevented people from 
reacting to differences in prices and costs such that reconstruction was severely retarded by 
lack of economic integration. While the government could actually rely on the planning for a 
future Polish state, prepared since 1907, the political agenda was set by the ongoing war that 
Polish troops fought with the Soviet army about the eastern borders of the state rather than by 
any “master plan”. The war required massive outlays and some mechanism to finance them. 
And as access to international credit was limited – Poland was yet to be formally recognized 
as a state -, the government aimed to tax capital and labour via a working fiscal administration 
and control over the currency. By June 1922 a common fiscal administration was functioning 
on most parts of the country, and by April 1920 the government  had unified the five (!) 
currencies that were in circulation on the Polish territory,
11 with the exception of Upper 
Silesia joining the Polish currency area in November 1923. Also, in October 1918 a railway 
ministry started its work unifying the various rolling materials, adjusting the huge differences 
in network densities and connecting the main economic centres of the former partition areas. 
A common external tariff  was introduced  in November 1919 for the then controlled 
territories, and the last remaining internal customs frontiers were liquidated after the armistice 
between Poland and Soviet Russia in mid-1921.
12 As indicated by both price and domestic 
trade flow data together these measures helped to quickly integrate the three former partition 
regions with each other and the newly gained regions in the east (see Wolf 2005).  
The taxation of capital and labour was actually the outcome of a compromise of the 
established elites with radical forces demanding a large-scale redistribution of capital and 
land. Due to the perceived danger of communist take-over, especially in the east, the first 
elected parliament (Sejm) approved in 1919  several laws to improve the conditions of 
industrial workers and a programme of land redistribution, however with full compensation of 
                                                 
11 These currencies were the German Mark, the Austrian Crown, and the Russian Rouble, as well as the Polish 
Mark in the Kingdom of Poland and the “Ost-Rubel” on the territory of “Ober Ost” - two currencies that the 
Germans introduced on former Russian territories after their occupation. 
12 Jerzy Tomaszewski (1966), also Kozlowski (1989), p.158.   17 
the owners.
13 After the Polish victory over the Red Army in 1921 some of these early political 
concessions were annulated, but the question of “agrarian reform” continued to be on the 
political agenda. Only in December 1925 a new compromise was reached, where owners of 
estates with more than 180 ha should sell their holdings above the limit at local market rates. 
If these voluntary transactions did not reach 200,000 ha per year, the government was entitled 
to force landholders to sell. In some eastern vojvodships the limit was set at 300 ha, for farms 
with industrial food processing the limit could be set at 700 ha, forests and estates belonging 
to the Catholic Church were exempted from the rule, and agricultural workers and peasants 
with small landholdings were given a pre-emption right (see Landau and Tomaszewski 1999, 
p. 135). Not surprisingly, the programme  failed to  improve the economic situation for the 
poorest peasants and did little to change the structure of landholdings in Poland 1925 – 1938 
(see  table 5). The area covered by small to medium sized peasant estates  (up to 50 ha) 
increased from 19.6 million ha (1921) to 22.5 million ha (1938) but also did the share of small 
and dwarf holdings (up to 5 ha) among them, rising from 27% (1921) to 29% (1938), while 
the share of small to medium sized holdings (5-20 ha) stagnated (59,7% to 59,3%).  If 
anything, the reform contributed to a rising debt-burden of peasants, which created severe 
difficulties during the depression years. The programme started in a period of relatively high 
agricultural prices, and rising profitability in agriculture just before the world-wide decline in 
agricultural prices due to a massive increase in cultivated areas overseas (see Kenwood and 
Lougheed 1999, p. 166). 
Very little was actually done to help  a further  intensification and modernization of 
production methods. On average, there was a use of 6.6 kg chemical fertilizers per ha of 
sowings in 1924/25, which rose to 10 kg/ ha in 1929/ 30, but declined to 7.1 kg/ ha in 1937/ 
38. Also, while the area under cultivation increased (see table 6), this came along with a 
decline in average land-productivity (table 7). The most notable changes in crop cultivation 
were an increase in the cultivation of wheat and rye in Galicia, indicating a slightly higher 
market orientation of Galician peasants, and a decline in the production of sugar beet 
everywhere, but especially in the most advanced western vojvodships. Similarly, while all 
Polish regions fell behind their land productivity of the pre-war years, it was the western 
vojvodhips that fared worst. If we take the wheat yields per ha of the Prussian partition, yields 
in Galicia stood at 54% of the average yield in the Prussian partition in 1913, but 71% in 
1934-38. The respective figures for the Kingdom of Poland are 57% (1913) and 79% (1934-
                                                 
13 In difference to most peasants, communist groups like the Moscow-dominated Tymczasowy Komitet 
Rewolucyjny in Bialystok under Marchlewski preferred state-ownership of the land, see Jezierski and 
Leszczynska 2003, p. 274f.    18 
38) and the development was similar for other crops. As labour productivity in the Prussian 
partition stayed at much higher levels than elsewhere (see MRS 1939), this relative 
improvement in land productivity in Galicia and the Kingdom of Poland must have been the 
outcome of an effective increase in agricultural workforce in these regions rather than of more 
intensive production methods.  
A general problem of Poland during the interwar years was the decline in the size of her 
market, both in terms of access to supply and demand. As I will explore below, this also 
affected the relationship between agriculture and overall economic development of the 
country. This decrease in market size was a consequence of two largely independent factors: 
the change in borders and the change in  world market prices before and during the great 
depression. First, while most of the new borders drawn in Central Europe at the end of the war 
could claim some legitimation, in economic, historical or other terms, conflicts about them 
continued, aggravated by the creation of ethnic minorities within these borders (see Müller 
and Schultz 2002) and the spread of communist rule in the east. In the Polish case, this led to 
a complete loss of Russia as her traditional market for manufactures and - after several special 
conditions of the Treaty of Versailles had expired in 1925 - to severe tariff conflicts with 
Germany as her traditional market for raw materials (Silesian coal) and agricultural products. 
Before the war, Great Poland alone exported on railways some 35,000 tons of rye just to 
Lower Silesia and Brandenburg, in 1925 Great Poland and Pomerania together shipped no 
more than 13,000 tons to these regions.
14 The tariff conflict was in part settled in 1934, but in 
the meantime, a large reorientation of trade flows had taken place (see table 2).  
With the widespread adoption of new techniques in agriculture in the 1920s and a large 
extension of agricultural acreage in various European countries and overseas but natural limits 
to demand, world market prices for agricultural products declined after 1926. This was 
especially so for wheat, rye and sugar, the typical export products of the more advanced 
Polish farms, and the situation was very much aggravated after the rise in tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to trade in the wake of the great depression (Kenwood and Lougheed 1999, p. 211ff.). 
In part, the loss of the German and the Russian market could be compensated by the now 
enlarged domestic market of Poland. And indeed, there is quite some evidence that this is 
what  happened for agricultural products and most of Polish manufactures.  Consider the 
openness ratios for Polish regions. As indicated earlier, the Kingdom of Poland shipped an 
                                                 
14 See Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1914), Statistik der Güterbewegung auf Deutschen Eisenbahnen im Jahre 
1913, Berlin, 1914 and Statistisches Reichsamt (1926), Die Güterbewegung auf Deutschen Esienbahnen im 
Jahre 1925, Berlin 1926. 
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incredible 66% of the total production value to Russian markets alone (Jezierski 1984, p. 
136f.). The very detailed Polish railway statistics depict virtually all trade flows in Polish and 
allow to calculate an “openness ratio” of the central vojvodships, close to congruent with the 
former Kingdom of Poland,  as the ratio of shipments to locations outside the central 
vojvodships to total shipments. This gives some 48% in  1926, and 50% in 1934, a large 
decline relative to 1900.
15 If we just take the ratio of shipments to locations outside of Poland 
to total shipments of the central vojvodships the figures are of course even lower, 15% in 
1926 and 11% in 1934. The corresponding numbers for Great Poland and Pomerania are very 
close to this, while in the case of Upper Silesia 77% in 1926 and 80% in 1934 of all shipments 
were shipped outside Upper Silesia, and 42% (1926) or 45% (1934) outside the country. We 
will come back to Upper Silesia below. 
Hence, agricultural producers in Great Poland and Pomerania successfully penetrated the 
new domestic market of Poland, net-exporting large amounts to the industrially more 
advanced regions in central Poland (Warsaw, Lodz) and Upper Silesia. Within the framework 
of a gravity model one can show that integration across the former partition borders was faster 
for agricultural markets than on average (see Wolf 2005, table 5). But this domestic market 
was rather limited by demand and competitors. The more market oriented estates in Galicia, 
the Kingdom of Poland and in the eastern vojvodship also tried to expand into the newly 
created Polish market, helped by rather low labour costs in these parts and a correspondingly 
low price level. If we set wheat prices in Poznan at 100, prices in Lwow stood at 87 (1927), 
96 (1929), 89 (1931), 86 (1933), while Galician wages for agricultural workers relative to the 
Prussian partition developed from 72 (1927) over 63 (1929), 64 (1931), 67 (1933). Data from 
domestic shipments on railways for the years 1926  – 1934 indicate that eastern Galicia 
(Lwow and Stanislawow) was a net-exporter of agricultural goods to other parts of Poland, 
mostly shipping to the more developed regions in western Galicia (Cracow) and Upper Silesia 
(Katowice), but even small amounts to Great Poland.  Moreover,  a shortage of chemical 
fertilizers and other industrial inputs previously imported  from Germany slowed down 
agricultural production in the more advanced parts of Polish agriculture, especially during the 
first years after the war (see Landau and Tomaszewski 1999, p. 94).  
                                                 
15 See Ministerstwo komunikacji, Centralne Biuro statystyki przewozów P.K.P. (ed.), Rocznik statystyczny 
przewozu towarów na polskich kolejach panstwowych wedlug poszczególnych rodzajów towarów [Statistical 
Yearbook of Transported Goods on Polish State Railways by Different Groups of Goods], Warsaw, 1925-1937. 
These railway statistics give shipments on railways in metric tons, within 9 Polish railway districts, between 
them and to foreign destinations, disaggregated for commodity groups. The “openness ratio” is calculated as the 
shipped tons, valued in f.o.b. prices, shipped to all locations excluding the ones within the district relative to all 
shipments. Obviously, this is not value added, which induced some downward bias in this “openness ratio” 
estimate.
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A very similar development took place in Polish manufacturing. Manufacturing industries 
in the former Kingdom of Poland had lost their huge Russian markets and faced increasing 
competition in world markets from overseas producers. The very fact that Poland’s industry 
stagnated but did not decline significantly is actually surprising. Rosa Luxemburg’s famous 
prediction of 1898 that Polish workers will  badly suffer from the restoration of a Polish 
national state and better join forces with their Russian comrades did not fully materialize.
16 
Consider the path of industrialization in terms of employment in Poland as a whole and the 
various parts of it (table 7). The estimated number of workers in mining and industries stood 
at roughly 800,000 in 1905 and initially decreased to some 680,000 in 1925 with virtually no 
industry in the eastern vojvodships.
17 The economic situation improved until 1929 when the 
number of  industrial workers reached 1,010,000 excluding, and 1,067,000 including the 
eastern vojvodships before a sharp reduction during the great depression. The prewar-level of 
industrial employment was reached only in 1935.  If we focus attention just on the textile 
industry in the vojvodship of Lodz, there were about 80,000 industrial workers at the turn of 
the century (Jezierski and Leszczyska 2003, p. 184). In 1925, this number was 82,000, peaked 
in 1928 at 163,000, declining to 128,000 (1931) and recovering to 168,000 in 1937.  
The new economic geography of interwar Poland was shaped by the interaction of the 
availability of a skilled (literate) labour force, access to domestic and foreign demand, and 
mineral resources which profited most to Upper Silesia, the central vojvodships and some 
parts in the poor south-east and east (Wolf 2006b). The situation for Upper Silesia was special 
insofar, as here the substitution of German demand was more successful than anywhere else. 
The great strike of mining workers in Britain 1926 helped to gain access to the British and 
Scandinavian market, and the government tried to foster this reorientation through a new 
direct railway connection from Katowice to the Baltic and a massive extension of port 
facilities at Gdynia (see Landau and Tomaszewski 1999, p. 307). However, the success of 
Poland’s coal in foreign markets was the exception to the rule and declining world market 
prices reduced the value of coal exports. 
The severe limitations of this (forced) inward oriented economic development became 
visible in the great depression. During the early 1920s the domestic market for industrial 
products was rising due to increases in agricultural incomes. Between 1925 and 1928 the 
prices of agricultural goods increased relative to prices for most manufacturing products and 
                                                 
16 This was one central thesis in her doctoral dissertation, and most probably influenced her further thinking 
about a communist internationalism, see Rosa Luxemburg (1898), Die industrielle Entwicklung Polens, Leipzig.  
17 This data is taken from the Labour Inspection statistics, 1925 – 1937, covering all firms with a minimum of 5 
workers, see Ministerstwo Pracy i Opieki Spolecznej (1926 – 1938), Inspekcja Pracy, Warsaw, various years. 
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with a stable currency the nominal incomes of peasants increased significantly (some 70% 
between 1926/27 and 1928/29, see Dziewicka 1955, p. 82). Small peasants were taking credits 
to enlarge their holdings  with the expectation to pay them back quickly. But i n 1928 the 
situation was reversed due t o the worldwide deflation in agricultural prices and the 
transmission mechanics under the Gold Standard to which Poland adhered since 1926/27. 
When manufacturing prices s tarted to decline in late 1929 with the onset of the great 
depression, the situation did not improve for the peasants, because the decline in agricultural 
prices was    - as in most other parts of the world  -  much steeper  than the decline in 
manufacturing prices (see Lewis 1949 for an early attempt to understand this phenomenon). 
For example, the price of 100 kg super phosphate in terms of rye was 31 kg in 1927/28, 68 kg 
in 1929/30 and 81 kg in 1935/36, the price of 100 packs of matches developed from 16 kg rye 
in 1927/28 to 76 kg rye in 1935/36 (see MRS 1938, p. 236). In consequence of that infamous 
“price scissor” effect,  and together with an ever increasing indebtedness of peasants, 
agricultural demand for industrial products steeply declined. Given the very large dependency 
of Polish industry on domestic demand, as shown above, industrial output and employment in 
Poland fell more than anywhere else in Europe and recovered much slower. In 1931, the value 
of industrial output was down to 58% of the 1929-level, compared to an European average of 
72% (see Feinstein et al. 1997, p. 106), the unemployment rate peaked in 1933 at incredible 
43.5% (see Landau and Tomaszewski 1999, p. 219) well above the European average, and a 
year after the first signs of recovery were visible in other European countries. In 1935, the 
unemployment rate still stood at 39.9%. 
  To overcome Poland’s economic backwardness in a world of increasing protectionism 
and a limited domestic market, and to react to growing unrest among workers, in 1936 a new 
government launched a programme of large-scale government investment.  From 1937 
onwards  the government channelled  funds  to the so-called Centralny Okreg Przemyslowy 
(COP), a huge area located in the central-east of Poland covering 15% of the country. The 
ideas expressed in  the  programmatic work of Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, then vice-prime 
minister and minister of finance, were similar to a “Big-push-industrialization” in the spirit of 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943):
18 the country needs  industrialization for development, but many 
industries cannot break-even without access to a sufficiently large market and hence, will 
either fail or never develop (see Murphy et al 1989, p. 1003). Energy and steel production, 
armament industries and consumption good industries were supposed to create to a large 
                                                 
18 The first plans for such a central industrial district were actually developed in the early 1920s but not realized, 
probably due to the great depression and to a very strict adherence of the relevant politicians to the rules of the 
gold standards. See Jezierski and Leszczynka 2003, p. 306f. and Knakiewicz (1967, p. 87ff.)   22 
degree their own market. While some of the plan was realized until 1939, it is questionable 
whether the COP could have succeeded in the environment of the 1930s. As pointed out in 
Murphy et al.(1989), a crucial factor is the scale of investment and expected future sales. 
Given the shortage of capital in the Polish economy, the already high level of taxation after 
the deflationary policies up to 1935, the massive outflow of capital during the depression and 
especially 1935 in anticipation of a devaluation, the government simply lacked the necessary 
means (see Landau and Tomaszewski 1964, p. 13 ff.). Foreign investment in Central Europe 
was drying up due to increasing political tensions, and most of the observed capital inflow 
was motivated by strategic aspects rather than expected profits (for example French credits to 
Polish armament industries). The German invasion of Poland in September 1939 ended any 
future development.  
 
IV.3 From the Second World War to 1973 
 
The Second World War, launched by Nazi-Germany, was again disastrous for the 
population of Poland and her economy. The population figures are still heavily disputed, but 
the population of Poland in 1946 is estimated at about 23.9 million people, roughly 18.8 
million of which on territories of the former Second Polish Republic and 4.8 million (excl. 
Gdansk) on the “recovered territories”  that were put under Polish administration after the 
conference of Potsdam. Among the 4.8 million inhabitants of the “recovered territories” in 
1946 were about 2 million people of German nationality (see RS 1947, p. 20). This compares 
to an estimated 23.6 million inhabitants on territories of the former Second Polish Republic in 
1939, about 8.5 million inhabitants of the “recovered territories” around 1939, and German 
figures estimating the cumulated  number of  expellees from  the  “recovered territories” 
(including East Prussia) at some 8.5 million until 1948. The latter number includes more than 
1 million deaths (see Reichling 1986) and probably about 5 million people that fled the 
approaching Red Army already prior to 1946. 
Clark (1957) estimated the Polish  national income per capita in 1946 at 76.6% of 
1938. However, these two numbers refer to quite different borders, and thereby  certainly 
underestimate the real losses of the war. While Poland lost poorly developed areas in the east, 
it gained rather advanced territories in the west. In 1931, the urbanization rate of the 
“recovered territories” stood already at 44% compared to a Polish average of 27.5 % and just 
14% of the population of the eastern territories living in cities (see table 3). Also, while the   23 
“recovered territories” accounted for just 20% of the population in 1946, 31% of all industrial 
plants were located in this part of the country (RS 1947, p. 71). 
Together with the westward shift of Poland’s borders (see map), a complete change in 
economic policies was put forward by the communist government under the auspices of the 
USSR. After a massively manipulated general election in January 1947 the Polish communist 
party (PPR) under Wladyslaw Gomulka gained power, but was not completely streamlined to 
the Kremlin before late 1948, when the more independent Gomulka was replaced by Boleslaw 
Bierut. A prominent place in the efforts to transform the Polish economy was a land reform 
that changed its character several times, and - equally important - was not implemented in all 
parts of Poland in the same way. The first task was to organize the settlement of the formerly 
German territories in the west, which started in the second half of 1945.  Inhabitants of 
German nationality (quite often also the “autochthones”, the Polish speaking minorities that 
lived in the region already before 1939) were expropriated and transported to regions east of 
the Oder-Neisse line, sanctioned by the Potsdam agreement of 1945. Moreover and eventually 
more importantly, the new Polish authorities started immediately after the war to redistribute 
all estates of more than 50 ha, on the “recovered territories” all estates of more than 100 ha, 
independent of the nationality of the owner. Table 5 shows that this policy had very large 
effects on the structure of landholdings by eliminating all large estates, which especially on 
the “recovered territories” represented the bulk of agriculturally used land. Until the end of 
1947 about 2 million people  - half of them from the former Polish east - settled on 440,000 
new settlements, most of them smaller than 10 ha, that were created out of these two groups 
of landholdings. However, the largest German estates were excluded from redistribution and 
administrated by a special state agency (Panstwowe Nieruchomosci Ziemskie, PNZ), initially 
with the aim of later redistribution. In 1950, out of 6.27 million ha agriculturally used land of 
the “recovered territories”  about 7% were owned by autochthones,  59%  by  new p easant 
settlers, 29% were under state administration, while the rest was mainly controlled by the Red 
Army. To compare, on average only 9.6% of all agricultural land of the new Polish state were 
under state administration (see Kostrowicki 1978, p. 41). 
When in late 1948 the government started a campaign towards a collectivization of 
Polish agriculture, its prospects were therefore very different in the different parts of the 
country.  Initially, t he government  tried to persuade  the peasants to  join  an agricultural 
cooperative group (Rolniczy Zespol Spodzielczy, RZS), promising them tax relieves, old age 
insurance, preferential health services, childcare and education as well as access to state 
owned machinery (Jezierski and Leszczynska 2003, p. 514). As most of the peasants did not   24 
respond to these incentives, in 1951 straight pressure was used, but equally failed. A much 
more efficient strategy proved  to be economic pressure applied from 1952 onwards.  The 
abolition of a market economy enabled the authorities to force peasants to sell their produce to 
state authorities at fixed prices, which were often set below production costs.  Insufficient 
sales were prosecuted by jail, forced entry to a RZS, or a partial redistribution of the land. In 
consequence, as still  most peasants refused to yield to the pressure the number of small 
holdings increased, but also did finally the number of RZSs.  
A major political change occurred in 1956, after a series of strikes of industrial 
workers with a death toll of over 70 people had weakened the hardliners, similar to other 
countries under communist rule. With Gomulka’s return to power, the economic pressure on 
individual peasants was significantly relieved, and the RZSs were stepwise replaced by 
peasant circles (Kolka Rolnicze), who were supposed to jointly invest in the intensification of 
agricultural production. The incentive to join a peasant circle was increased by the fact that 
only members of the circles had access to  government credit  via a newly established 
Agricultural Development Fund (Fundusz Rozwoju Rolnictwa) and especially to building 
material. This time it worked better, also because the idea of peasant circles had a long non-
communist tradition in Poland (Kostrowicki 1978, p. 38):  while  in 1959 only 17% of all 
peasants belonged to such circles, by 1968 the share had risen to 54%. Another important 
change was the adoption of a law allowing to exchange a peasant holding for an old-age state 
pension in 1968 together with new efforts towards a consolidation of landholdings.  
Taken together, land reforms and attempts towards a collectivization of agriculture 
changed the structure of Poland’s agriculture  to the worse and probably slowed down 
productivity growth. Comparing just the privately owned landholdings  - in 1970 still 83.4% 
of the total area - to the situation 1921, the number share of very small agricultural estates (up 
to 5 ha) was completely stable (61.6% in 1921 to 61.8% in 1970), while their share in the total 
cultivated area had significantly increased (14% in 1921 to 26% in 1970), indicating that the 
forced redistribution of land from the private large estates immediately after the war mainly 
helped to turn dwarfed landholdings into  very  small ones. Still, these dwarf landholdings 
dominated in Galicia, they were important in the centre, but negligible in the former western 
vojvodships as well as in the “recovered territories” (see Kostrowicki 1978, pp. 21-23). In 
contrast, the number of medium-sized landholdings (5-20 ha) increased in terms of number 
share (35.1% in 1921, 37.1% in 1970), but much more in terms of area share (31% in 1921, 
68% in 1970). The agricultural policy however was most successful in limiting the number 
share of large private estates (larger than 20 ha), which often were the technically most   25 
advanced ones. Their number share declined from 3% (1921) to just 1.1% (1970), while their 
share in total cultivated area sacked from 37.2% (1921) to just 6% (1970). Instead, there was 
now a growing number of public farms (Panstwowe Gospodarstwa Rolne, PGR), nearly all of 
them under direct control of the ministry of agriculture, increasing in number and area, with 
an average size of 410 ha in 1960 525 ha in 1970 (Kostrowicki 1978, p. 41). By far most of 
them were situated in the former western vojvodships, where many large “capitalist” estates 
were expropriated after the war and especially in the “recovered territories” (see the map in 
Kostrowicki 1978, p. 43).  
In output structure (see table 6), still the four grains, potatoes, and sugar beats were the 
most important crops (accounting for 75% of total sowings 1966-70 compared to 80% in 
1934-38), but there were interesting changes in their respective relevance. The share of all 
grains and potatoes in the total cultivated areas of Poland after 1946 was roughly similar to 
their shares in the Second Republic 1934-38, so that the border changes  were apparently 
unimportant in this case. What did change was the area of sugar beet production, because 
Poland gained regions in Lower Silesia, Pomerania, and West Prussia with rather sizeable and 
often industrial sugar beet production (Kostrowicki 1978, p. 263). Compared to 1934-38, the 
share of sugar beet in total sowing area tripled from 0.8% to 2.5% in 1950-55. Over time, 
wheat became more important at the cost of rye, reflecting a general trend in European 
agriculture, and oats production was reduced due to the declining relevance of horses. The 
share of industrial crops such as sugar beets, but also rape-seed, flax, hemp, etc. in the total 
cultivated area increased over time, from 4.1% in 1950 to 6.2% 1970 (see Kostrowicki 1978, 
p. 260). Besides these changes in crop cultivation, the number in animal husbandry changed. 
After disastrous losses during and immediately after the war, all kind of husbandry increased 
in number until 1960, especially the number of pigs (from 9.5 million in 1950 to 13.5 million 
in 1970), but also that of chicken, while the number of sheep and horses started to decline 
again.  Similar to the interwar period, the cattle (cows), but also chicken were held 
predominantly in the small privately owned Galician farms, while pigs were produced in 
Great Poland.  Importantly, animal husbandry was until 1970 mainly an issue of private 
peasant farming, not of the PGRs, which changed afterwards (Kostrowicki 1978, pp. 305ff.). 
Land productivity was on the rise in Poland after the worst devastations of the war 
were removed and the new political and economic system was established. (see table 7). For 
example, wheat yields per ha increased from 13.1 (1950-55) to 23.2 (1966-70), well ahead of 
countries like the USSR, Bulgaria, also Spain, but lagging behind West-Germany or France 
(see  Jezierski and  Leszczynska 2003, p. 512).  Strikingly, the old pattern of a highly   26 
productive agriculture in the former western vojvodships (the old “Prussian partition”) 
survived well into 1970. The Galician south was slowly catching up to the average as did the 
centre, but the most interesting part is played by the “recovered territories”, where most of the 
state-owned PGRs were located. The land productivity in these parts  were roughly at the 
Polish average, but much lower than in Great Poland and other parts of the old “Prussian 
partition”. In spite of their many privileges, land productivity in the state-owned agricultural 
estates (PGRs) stayed systematically below that of the much smaller private landholdings. In 
1950, the average value of output for all Polish farms was 7905 zl per ha, but 8125 zl/ ha for 
private farms compared to a mere 6135 zl/ha for state-owned farms. Together with overall 
rises in productivity, the government agencies did their best to reduce this 32% gap to 27% in 
1955, 26% in 1965, and finally just 19% in 1970 (Kostrowicki 1978, p. 364).  Labor 
productivity did also increase between 1950 and 1970, with even larger differences across the 
country. Here the centre and the south lagged significantly behind the west and north-west 
without any signs of convergence.  
Therefore, the rise in land productivity was certainly not a consequence of changes 
neither in ownership nor of increasing labor input but of an intensification of production. The 
use of chemical fertilizers per ha increased dramatically over time (from 4.9 in 1937/38 to 
17.7 in 1949/50, 36.5 in 1959/60 and a bold 123.6 in 1969/70). While the numbers of horses 
declined slowly, the number of tractors increased quite dramatically, from 28,400 in 1950 to 
224,500 in 1970 or one per ha 719.7 in 1950 to one per 87 ha in  1970 ( Jezierski and 
Leszczynska 2003, p. 521). A new factor in agricultural production was the increasing supply 
of electrical power to remote villages. In 1945 about 2.2% of all farms had access to 
electricity, similar to the situation in 1938, in 1950 the share had risen to 19% and in 1970 to 
90.8% (Economic History of Poland in Numbers (1994), p. 151).  
Given these increases in agricultural output, to what market did this  agricultural 
supply go to? The share of people living from agriculture declined rapidly after the Second 
World War, from 64% in 1931 to 47.1% in 1950, 38.4% in 1960 to 29.8% in 1970 (see table 
4). Most of these people found employment in industry, massively promoted by the 
communist government. According to the system of economic planning, the share of industry 
should be significantly increased. The first 6-year plan from July 1950 aimed not only at an 
increase in industrial production, but also in agricultural production, real wages, and national 
income. Interestingly, the plan was massively over fulfilled 1950-55 for industrial production 
(actual production in 1955 was 13% above the plan, agricultural production 37% below), but 
failed in all other respects. A similar fate met the 5 -years plan of 1955 with industrial   27 
production 10% above, agricultural production 3.5% below (see Jezierski and Leszczynska 
2003, p. 492). A key reason for this was a change in the first plan immediately after it was 
issued due to the Korea crisis, namely to significantly enlarge the armament industry at the 
cost of all other parts of the Polish economy.  As the armament industry was statistically 
hidden in the “electro-mechanical industries” we observe a significant increase in the share of 
that industry in the total value of industrial output, from 6.2% (1950) over 15.9% (1960), to 
23.6 % (1970). At the same time the share of food industries declined from 34.1% over 26.8% 
to 21.5% (1970). A large part of this output was exported to the USSR and various parts of 
the world, changing the structure of Polish foreign trade (see Jezierski and Leszczynska 2003, 
p. 506). In a way, while not being the outcome of a market economy, the planners followed 
here the lines of comparative advantage:  compared to other parts of the Comecon, central 
Poland and Silesia (as well as parts of Czechoslovakia and of course, the GDR) were 
especially well prepared to produce additional  armament output. The westward-shift of 
Poland’s borders, the large disintegration with the west especially until the 1970s, and the aim 
to quickly increase military production had changed Poland’s comparative advantage once 
more (see table 2).  
In contrast t o the large industrial exports, agricultural exports declined. The rising 
Polish food production went to a very large degree into the Polish domestic market, where 
higher real wages allowed higher consumption. The simultaneous lack of industrial consumer 
goods produced record-prone levels of food consumption (pushing Engel’s law to the limits): 
in 1950 one person consumed on average 810.5 kg food per year, in 1960 849 kg, in 1970 866 
kg, while today, in spite of significantly higher incomes, consumption is down to 768.7 kg per 
person (see Malecki-Tepicht 2005, p. 11). Especially the consumption of meat and fish 
increased during this period. The early 1970s saw a major reorientation of Polish industry, 
internally towards consumer products, and externally towards western markets, often 
accompanied by early forms of western foreign direct investment. It is here, when Poland 




  The economic history of Poland after 1870 is very much driven by the interplay of 
agriculture, industry, and the changing access to markets. This development takes place on the 
background of secular trends towards more intensive agriculture and  broad  technological 
change. But the regional differences are striking. In 1870 the various parts of Poland were still   28 
rather similar in their economic structures, all characterized by an  extensive agriculture, 
except Upper Silesia where rich mineral resources  induced an early industrialization.  By 
1914, the Kingdom of Poland had become a net-importer of agricultural products, itself 
exporting large volumes of manufacturing into the huge Russian markets, Great Poland and 
Pomerania had developed a highly productive intensive agriculture and successfully net-
exported agricultural products to neighboring industrial centers (inc. Upper Silesia and the 
Kingdom of Poland), while Galicia essentially failed to develop at all. I have shown how this 
divergence was related to  specialization along the lines of local comparative advantages 
between the partition areas and  the partitioning powers,  including  aspects of economic 
nationalism and poor institutions. The creation of an independent Polish state after WWI was 
accompanied by a sharp disintegration with the partitioning powers, reorienting trade flows 
both to alternative t rading partners (esp. UK) and towards the new domestic market.  The 
integration of the Polish partition areas into one market economy proceeded quick and 
induced some limited convergence between the Polish regions. But under the conditions of 
the Interwar Years, with deteriorating terms of trade for exporters of agricultural products and 
raw materials, and worldwide declining import demand this was mostly a convergence to the 
bottom. Polish agriculture experienced a bad crisis, which in turn limited the already small 
domestic market for Polish industrial products. It is this limitation of the domestic market that 
motivated, at the end of the 1930s, the first attempts towards a large-scaled state-planned 
“Big-push industrialization” in the spirit of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943).  After WWII, when 
Poland had suffered  huge losses, the westward shift of the country and  a  very uneven 
implementation of economic policies preserved old structural differences between the regions 
of Poland and created new ones, especially in agriculture. The intensification of agriculture 
proceeded, helped not so much by new policies than by another change in local comparative 
advantage: the USSR was Poland’s largest trading partner after 1950.  
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Data from Pribram (1938), Hoszowski (1934), Gorkiewicz (1950), Statistisches Jahrbuch für den Preußischen Staat (1863 f.).   35 
Table 1: Commodity Trade Balance for the three Partition Areas around 1914, in Million Mark  
(per capita values in Mark are given in parentheses) 
 
  Kingdom of Poland  Galicia  Prussian Partition 
Agricultural Products  -49.1 (-4.4)  24.1 (3.0)  341.5 (56.9) 
Raw Materials  -369.6 (-33.0)  47.9 (5.9)  367.7 (61.3) 
Industrial Products  587.2 (52.4)  -254.8 (-31.5)  -65.4 (-10.9) 
Total  168.5 (15.0)  -182.8 (-22.6)  643.8 (107.3) 




Table 2: The reorientations of Poland’s foreign trade (Imports and Exports as % of total trade value, current prices) 
 
  1923  1926  1928  1932  1935  1937  1950  1960  1970 
  Imp/ Exp  Imp/ Exp  Imp/ Exp  Imp/ Exp  Imp/ Exp  Imp/ Exp  Imp/ Exp  Imp/ Exp  Imp/ Exp 
Germany  
(1950-70: sum of 
FRG and GDR) 
44/51  24/25  23/34  20/16  14/15  15/14  15/16  18/14  15/14 
FRG  3/2  5/5  4/5 
GDR 
- 





14/16  13/21  14/26  10/17  9/13  9/10  19/17  13/14  14/13 
Czechoslovakia/ 
CSSR 
5/5  5/9  6/12  5/8  4/6  4/4  13/9  9/9  9/8 
USSR  0/2  1/2  1/2  2/3  3/3  1/0  29/24  31/29  38/35 
UK  8/6  10/17  9/9  9/16  14/20  12/18  10/8  6/8  5/4 
Sources: Interwar Years: Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego, Statystyka Polski, Serja C [Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade, Polish Statistics], Warsaw, different years, Postwar 




   36 
Table 3: Area, Population, and Urbanization in Polish Regions and Poland, mid 19
th century – 1970 



















Approximately the “old territories” in post-1946 usage 
East (Eastern  
Vojvodships)  
Territories of the former 
German East (incl. 
western Upper Silesia) or 
“Recovered Territories” 
in post-1946 usage 
 




(273590)  127321  78497  28989  25553  13230  na 
 










311700  208900  na  102800 
Population estimates (in 1000) 
1846  13113  4867  4876  1364  1019  987 
1870  15733  6079  5492  1570  1304  1288 
1897  21586  9402  7047  1848  1517  1772 




1921  26866  11233  7488  1968  936**  1125**  4116  na 
12341  8507  2340  1080  1534  1931   





1950  25008 
1960  29776 
1970  32642 
 
na 
   
Estimated Urbanization rates  (share of people living in towns exceeding 10,000 inhabitants, after 1931 administrative definition) 
1857/61  -  5.1  4.5  6.2  11.6  5.6 
1897/1900  15.4  17.5  9.6  12.7  20.6  26.2 
1909/10  18.5  18.3  13.1  16.6  24.6  36.2 
 
na 
1921  26.0  32.0  21.0  30.0  13.0   
1931  27.5  33.5  22.6  40.0  33.0**  32.0**  14.0  44.0 
1950  39.0 
1960  48.3 
1970  52.3 
 
na 
Sources: Central Statistical Office (1994), Economic History of Poland in Numbers, pp. 74ff., Central Statistical Office (1939), Maly Rocznik Statystyczny 1939, pp. 10-11, 
Rocznik Statystyczny 1947, and own calculations,  (*) While disputable, Polish historians usually treat Upper Silesia as historical part of Poland due to the large number of Polish 
speaking people (**) note the major changes in area compared to pre-1918   37 
Table 4: Estimates of Occupational Structure, National Product, and Sectoral Shares 
 
  Share of Population living from Agriculture in % 
  Poland 
(respective borders) 
Kingdom of Poland  Galicia  Great Poland and 
Pomerania 
Upper Silesia  Eastern Vojvodhsips 
About 1900  na  57  77  52  29  73 
1921  66 
1931  64 
1950  47 
1960  38 




GDP (million 1990 Geary Khamis 
US$) 
Per capita GDP (million 1990 
Geary Khamis US$) 
Share of Agriculture in % of 
National Income 
Share of Industry 











1929  58980  2117  na  na 
1935  48107  1597  29.5  41.7 
1947  Na  Na  37.7  35.3 
1955  76049  2788  25.3  49.8 
1960  95121  3218  22.7  47.5 
1970  144018  4428  15.7  54.5 
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Table 5: The Size-Structure of Landholdings in Poland (% share in total number/ % share in total area) 
 
  All 
landholdings 
Peasant landholdings  All landholdings 















Eastern Vojvodships  “Recovered 
Territories” 
    1905  1902  1907
(1) 
Up to 5 ha  65/ 31  81/ 49  78/ 13 
5-20 ha  33/ 56  18/ 40  19/ 47 
Above 20 ha 
 
na 




  1921  1921   
Up to 5 ha  64.7/ 14.8  62.2/ 37  51.8/ na  87.1/ na  58.8/ na  39.6/ na 
5-20 ha  32/ 30.8  35.3/ 59.7  44.9/ na  12.1/ na  30.5/ na  45.8/ na 
Above 20 ha  3.3/ 54.4  2.5/ 13.3  3.3/ na  0.8/ na  7.9/ na  4.6/ na 
 
na 
  1938  1938  1939 
Up to 5 ha  na  64.5/ 29  na  na  na  na  41.7/ 4.5 
5-20 ha  na  33.4/ 59.3  na  na  na  na  42.6/ 23.6 
Above 20 ha  na  2.1/ 11.7  na  na  na  na  15.7/ 71.9 
  1950   
Up to 5 ha  na  57.2/ 25 
5-20 ha  na  41.5/ 68.1 
Above 20 ha  na  1.3/ 6.9 
 
na 
  1970   
Up to 5 ha  na  61.8/ 26 
5-20 ha  na  37.1/ 68 
Above 20 ha  na  1.1/ 6 
 
na 
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Table 6: Main Crops in Polish Agriculture 1909 – 1970, area sown in 1000 ha (percentage share of crop in total of 6 main crops in parentheses) 
 
    Poland in 
respective borders 













1909-13  Wheat  1353 (0.104)  497 (0.089)  538 (0.192)  131 (0.064)  187 (0.072) 
  Rye  5087 (0.391)  2245 (0.402)  700 (0.250)  936 (0.458)  1206 (0.464) 
  Barley  1265 (0.097)  498 (0.089)  341 (0.122)  164 (0.080)  262 (0.101) 
  Oats  2749 (0.211)  1186 (0.212)  697 (0.249)  277 (0.136)  589 (0.227) 
  Potatoes  2404 (0.185)  1085 (0.194)  522 (0.189)  452 (0.221)  345 (0.133) 
  Sugar Beet  168 (0.013)  72 (0.013)  6 (0.002)  82 (0.040)  8 (0.003) 
1925-29  Wheat  1337 (0.104)  476 (0.088)  488 (0.180)  169 (0.080)  204 (0.077) 
  Rye  5672 (0.441)  2650 (0.491)  792 (0.292)  985 (0.469)  1245 (0.467) 
  Barley  1150 (0.089)  389 (0.072)  312 (0.115)  171 (0.081)  278 (0.104) 
  Oats  2026 (0.157)  748 (0.139)  577 (0.213)  244 (0.116)  457 (0.172) 
  Potatoes  2479 (0.193)  1056 (0.196)  522 (0.193)  433 (0.206)  468 (0.176) 









1934-38  Wheat  1738 (0.124)  557 (0.104)  620 (0.205)  241 (0.091)  320 (0.107)  350 (0.096) 
  Rye  5774 (0.413)  2459 (0.460)  797 (0.263)  1259 (0.477)  1259 (0.423)  1390 (0.381) 
  Barley  1199 (0.086)  364 (0.068)  316 (0.104)  227 (0.086)  292 (0.098)  355 (0.097) 
  Oats  2250 (0.161)  793 (0.148)  624 (0.206)  271 (0.103)  562 (0.189)  630 (0.173) 
  Potatoes  2899 (0.207)  1137 (0.213)  658 (0.217)  565 (0.214)  539 (0.181)  814 (0.223) 
  Sugar Beet  130 (0.009)  37 (0.007)  12 (0.004)  74 (0.028)  7 (0.002)  111 (0.030) 
1953-60  Wheat  1466 (0.122) 
  Rye  4975 (0.413) 
  Barley  864 (0.072) 
  Oats  1668 (0.138) 
  Potatoes  2709 (0.225) 
  Sugar Beet  373 (0.031) 
1961-70  Wheat  1692 (0.148) 
  Rye  4342 (0.379) 
  Barley  719 (0.063) 
  Oats  1490 (0.130) 
  Potatoes  2793 (0.244) 






Sources: MRS 1930, p. 19, MRS 1939,  p. 78f., RS 1947, p. 45, Economic History of Poland in Numbers (1994), p. 145f.    40 
 
 
Table 7: Land productivity 1909 – 1970 (yield in quintal/ ha for main crops), in Poland, her regions, and the former partition powers  
 

























1878-1882  Wheat  9.4  9.1  11.2 
  Rye  8.7  8.0  10.1 
  Potatoes  63  85  65 
  Sugar Beet 
 
na 
na  na  na 
 
na 
1909-13  Wheat  22.7  6.9  13.2  12.4  12.3  11.7  19.9  9.5 
  Rye  18.6  7.5  11.8  11.2  10.5  11.3  16.9  8.1 
  Potatoes  138  69  80  103  95  110  142  68 
  Sugar Beet  300  161  na  245  196  200  300  155 
1925-29  Wheat  12.3  13.1  9.8  19.1  10.9 
  Rye  10.9  10.6  9.6  14.0  8.6 
  Potatoes  107  113  101  120  88 
  Sugar Beet 
 
na 
202  184  187  227  150 
1934-38  Wheat  22.0  7.8  13.6  11.9  11.9  10.8  15.2  11.3 
  Rye  17.6  8.9  11.7  11.2  11.0  10.6  13.1  10.0 
  Potatoes  158  84  64  121  128  112  129  109 
  Sugar Beet  292  96  na  216  203  186  230  187 
1953-60  Wheat  27.1  10.5  15.0  14.6 
  Rye  na  na  na  13.6 
  Potatoes  na  na  na  124 
  Sugar Beet  na  na  na  191 
1961-70  Wheat  44.7
(1)  14.5
(1)  33.2
(1)  21.4 
  Rye  na  na  na  17.2 
  Potatoes  na  na  na  164 













Table 8: Number of Workers in Industry and Mining 1902 – 1970, in thousands (data 1950-70 refers to public industries) 
 
Prussian partition and Upper Silesia (western 
vojvodships) 
  Poland 
(respective 
borders) 





Great Poland and 
Pomerania 
Upper Silesia 
Eastern vojvodships  “Recovered 
Territories” 
About 1905  na  335 (1904)  90 (1902)  122 (1907)  243 (1907)  na 
1925  710  333  136  76  129
(1)  36 
1929  1067  493  181  118  219
(1)  57 
1934  826  412  135  95  129
(1)  55 
1937  1050  516  187  118  157




1945 (July)  738  625  na  113 
1950  1936 
1960  2928 
1970  4044 
 
na 
Sources: Data for pre-WWI and post WWII from Economic History of Poland in Numbers (1994), pp. 75, 105-108, 155, data for Interwar Years from Inspekcja Pracy (1926-
1938), data for 1945 from RS 1947 (1947). (1) Data refer to the part of Upper Silesia, which after the referendum in 1921 became part of Poland.   42 
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